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Resolution 242 Revisited: New Evidence on the
Required Scope of Israeli Withdrawal
Eugene Kontorovich*
Abstract
United Nations Securioy Council Resolution 242, passed in the wake of the Six-Day
War in 1967, is one of the body's most famous decisions. The resolution called for
"/w]ithdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." The
meaning of this provision-in particular,the extent of the required withdrawal-has been
contested ever since. This Article presents new evidence on Resolution 242's meaning, adding
two important but previously unexamined lines of evidence that bear on its interpretation.It
compares the resolution's withdrawalprovision to all other such territorialdemands issued by
the Security Council. The marked difference that emerges between Resolution 242's wording
and that of all other such resolutions suggests the former was a meaningful and substantive
drafting choice. The Article then sheds further light on the preamble's reference to the
"inadmissibiliy" of conquest by examining original understandings of the U.N. Charter.
Internationaljurists of the post-World War II era believed the Charterprohibited teritorial
changes as a result of war but only with significant limitations and exceptions. The new
evidence presented here supports the view that Resolution 242 contemplates only a partial
Israeli withdrawal. This understanding is pariculary relevant to current suggestions to
"update" Resolution 242 by a new Security Council resolution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242,' passed in November
1967 in the wake of the Six-Day War, is widely regarded as among the most
important of all the Council's measures.2 It remains the foundation of the U.N.'s
approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict.' The resolution famously calls for the
"[w]ithdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent
conflict." The meaning of this provision has been contested ever since. 4
One interpretation holds that Resolution 242 requires a complete Israeli
withdrawal from all the territories that came under its control during the Six-Day
War. This is consistent with, but not mandated by, a straightforward reading of
the language and the French text.' Proponents of the broad interpretation of the
resolution also point to the preamble's reference to the "inadmissibility of the
acquisition of territory in war" as corroborating their position.'
Yet the drafting history of the provision tells a different story. The British
and U.S. diplomats involved in framing the resolution specifically omitted a
"the" before "territories" to leave the extent of the required withdrawal open for
future negotiations between Israel and its neighbors. 7 Indeed, over several
months of deliberations in the Council, the U.K. and U.S. rejected attempts by
I
2

S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 22d Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2, at 8-9 (Nov. 22, 1967).
See Bruce D. Jones, The Securiy Council and the Arab-Israeli Wars: 'Responsibility nithout Power, in THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIl. AND WAR: THE EvoLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE

SINCE 1945 298, 308-09 (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008).
3

Seefor example, S.C. Res. 338, U.N. SCOR, 28th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/29, at 10 (Oct. 22, 1973);
S.C. Res. 1397, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF/57, at 220 (Mar. 12, 2002); see also U.N. G.A.Res.
68/262 (Mar. 29, 2012) (citing Resolution 242 as a "basis" for a Middle East peace settlement).

4

SeeJOHN QUIGLEY, THE CASE FOR PAI.ESTINE: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 170 (2005)

(noting that the removal of the word "the" from Resolution 242 makes it "unclear whether
withdrawal was to be from all the territories ... or only from some portion").
5

6

7

The French text refers to "des ternitozes." "Des" itself is neither a definite nor indefinite article, but
can sometimes be used as the former. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, On Multilingual Interpretation, in
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 449, 451-52 (2007) (arguing that, because
negotiations and the original U.K. draft were in English, that language should be seen as
controlling); see also Jones, supra note 2, at 308. But see Toribio de Valdes, Comment, The
Authonitativeness of the English and French Texts of Security Counil Resolution 242 (1967) on the Situation in
the Middle East, 71 AM.J. INT'L L. 311, 316 (1977) (arguing that the French and English conflict
and, because they are both official languages, "are of equal weight").
See infra Section IV.
See ARTHUR LAI.L, THE U.N. AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, 1967 253-54 (1968); see also Jones,
supra note 2, at 308-09; DENNIS RoSS, THE MISSING PEACE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FIGHT
FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE 807 n.26 (2004); Vernon Turner, Special Advisor, Can. Foreign
Ministry Task Force on Cent. & E. Eur., 7he Intent of UNSC 242-The View of Non-RegionalActors,
Presentation at the Washington Institute Harris Symposium (1992), in U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 242: THE BUILDING BLOCK OF PEACEMAKING 21, 27 (1993).
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the Arab-aligned nations to explicitly require withdrawal from "all" or "the"
territories.8 The Western states insisted that it would be both unreasonable and
unrealistic to require a complete Israeli withdrawal to the 1949 Armistice Lines,
which would also entail a complete Israeli abandonment of Jerusalem's holy
sites.
The stakes of the "the" debate are high. Resolution 242 is variously cited as
both supporting and negating Israeli territorial claims to the Golan Heights and
the West Bank. 9 Others see it as establishing the general principle that future
borders will be based on negotiations, not dogmatic adherence to the 1949
Armistice Lines.' 0 According to one reading, Israel has been flouting a Security
Resolution for nearly five decades. According to the other, Israel has already
complied-by relinquishing well over 90% of territory it occupied (the entire
Sinai Peninsula, all of Gaza, parts of the West Bank, and small parts of the
Golan)." And so the debate has gone back and forth, with much heat but little
new light in the past four decades.
Moreover, as of this writing, significant efforts by the European Union,
and potentially the U.S., are aimed at passing a new Security Council resolution
"updating" Resolution 242.12 Whether such a resolution merely restates the
territorial conclusions of its predecessor or aggressively takes away Israeli
entitlements under the compromise of 1967-giving what the U.N. conceded to
8

See Eugene V. Rostow, The Drafting of Security Council Resolution 242: The Role of the Non-Regional
Actors, 25 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 489, 499-502 (1993) (describing contemporaneous statements
by U.S. officials involved in the negotiations that a complete withdrawal was explicitly rejected).

9

10

Compare Richard A. Falk, The Beirut Raid and the InternationalLaw of Retaliation, 63 Ams. J. INT'L L.
415, 435 n. 55 (1969) (arguing that Israel retains territories secured in 1967 "in violation" of 242),
and Quincy Wright, The Middle East Problem, 64 A. J. INT'L L. 270, 369 (1970), with Yehuda Blum,
The Territorial Clauses of Security Council Resolution 242, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFF. (June 4,
2007), available at http://www.jcpa.org/text/resolution242-blum.pdf (arguing that drafting history
and other provisions of 242 show it does not require full Israeli withdrawal), and Rostow, supra
note 8 (arguing that the drafting history of 242 makes clear that it does not require a complete
withdrawal). For a survey of authorities, see Victor Kattan, The Legality of the West Bank Wall:
Israel's High Court of Justice v. the InternationalCourt ofJustice, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1425, 1461
n.190 (2007) (rejecting the "right-wing" view that complete withdrawal is not required).
See, for example, S.C. Res. 1397, supra note 3 (referring to Resolution 242 in the preamble); Letter

11

from George W. Bush, President, United States, to Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister, Israel (April 14,
2004), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archves.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040414-3.html
("As part of a final peace settlement, Israel must have secure and recognized borders, which
should emerge from negotiations between the parties in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242
and 338."); ROSS, supra note 7, at 70-71, 80.
See MARTIN GILBERT, THE ROUTLEDGE ATLAS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFICT 70, 74, 115, 151,

12

170 (10th ed. 2012).
See Herb Keinon, After Israeli elections, Palestine issue to once again take center stage, JERUSALEM POST,
Feb. 21, 2015, available at http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Wherethe-twain-may-meet-391616.
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Israel then to the Arabs today-depends on what was really decided in 1967. If
Resolution 242 required a full withdrawal, then a "new peace architecture," 3
even one that would spell out Israel's complete withdrawal from the West Bank
in great detail, would not change the fundamental territorial parameters
established by the Council in 1967. But if Resolution 242 allows a partial
withdrawal, then the proposed new resolutions would contradict and
countermand the earlier resolution, to Israel's substantial disadvantage.
Even as the Council is poised to revisit the legacy of Resolution 242,
important evidence that bears on how that resolution should be read has not
been examined. This evidence-the wording of other territorial withdrawal
demands passed in other situations by the Security Council-demonstrates the
significance of the missing "the." Looking at parallel language in other measures
by the same body is a recognized tool of interpretation, yet one that has not
been applied in relation to Resolution 242. Additionally, examining the postWorld War II discussions in the U.N.'s International Law Commission, where
the leading international jurists of the time discussed the principle against
territorial acquisition and its limits, sheds new light on the resolution's meaning.
This understanding of the non-acquisition principle was confirmed by (and
perhaps was necessary to reconcile the U.N. Charter with) contemporaneous
state practice.
This Article does not aim at a comprehensive evaluation of Resolution 242.
The arguments about its drafting history and multilingual texts have been heavily
rehearsed. 4 The central argument against the narrow Anglo-American
interpretation is that a definite article before "territories" is unnecessary to
connote a complete withdrawal. In this view, saying "withdrawal from
territories" is a natural formulation for connoting a complete withdrawal."5 In
short, if a "the" would be superfluous anyway, then its absence does not mean
anything. That proposition is not merely a grammatical one-it is also one about
convention and usage, and as such can be empirically tested.
Section II of this Article explains how parallel language in other U.N.
Security Council resolutions can be used to shed light on the meaning of
Resolution 242. Section III applies this approach by comprehensively surveying
other resolutions calling for territorial withdrawal in other geopolitical situations.

13

14

Robert Serry, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Security Council Briefing
(Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/about/speeches/pid/
25924.
The debate over the meaning of the resolution and the effect of the missing "the" began almost

15

immediately after the resolution's passage and has continued to the present day. See Kattan, supra
note 9, at 1461 & n.90; see sources cited supra notes 4-9.
See generaly Kattan, supra note 9, at 1461 & n.90.
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It finds that when they call for complete withdrawal, they use unambiguous
language distinct from that found in Resolution 242. Indeed, Resolution 242's
phraseology is unique. Section IV presents new context for understanding the
perambulatory phrase about the "inadmissibility" of territorial acquisition. It
shows that in light of the legal principles developed by the U.N.'s International
Law Commission before 1967, this inadmissibility was not understood to be
absolute. Moreover, the writings of eminent publicists and the drafting debates
over the U.N.'s Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970 show that there was no
agreement on the relevant particulars of the territorial acquisition norm in 1967.
Instead, the norm as it stood in 1967 had well-known lacunae, potentially
including non-sovereign territory and lawful uses of force. These sources,
spanning the full array of contemporaneous opinojur7is, provide clear evidence
that the "anti-acquisition norm," as it stood in 1967, had not progressed to fully
cover Israel's gains that year.
The Article concludes that the case for the narrow reading of Resolution
242-as requiring only partial Israeli withdrawal from the territories that came
under its control in 1967-is significantly stronger when considered against the
background of broader Security Council and U.N. principles and practice.
II. PARALLEL LANGUAGE AS AN INTERPRETIVE TOOL
One technique for interpreting the meaning of language in a legal text, such
as a statute or contract, is to compare it with similar expressions in parallel
enactments. Checking for such "external" consistency of legal instruments is
important to ensure coherence and fairness within a system: similar words used
by the same body should have similar consequences and different ones different
consequences, absent significant countervailing reasons. Such comparisons are
also useful for assessing the importance of the different wording used in
different measures. The use of a standard language to express something
suggests that language has a fixed meaning. It also suggests that departures from
the standard form are purposeful and significant. Such an inquiry has not
previously been undertaken for the "canonical" Resolution 242. However, in
discussing Resolution 242, commentators have made arguments based on an
array of other interpretive methods and tools, including plain meaning,16 drafting
history," other provisions of the instrument, and background principles of
international law. 18
16
17
18

Compare Kattan, supra note 9, with QUIGLEY, supra note 4.
See sources cited supra notes 7-8.
See, for example, Adnan Abu Odeh, Permanent Representative of Jordan to the U.N., The Origns
and Relevance of UNSC Resolulion 242, Presentation at the Washington Institute Harris Symposium
(1992), in U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242: THF, BUILDING BLOCK OF PEACEMAKING
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There has been relatively little study of the particular interpretive
methodology for Security Council resolutions, as opposed to treaties and other
legal instruments. 9 Security Council resolutions are neither treaties, nor
legislation, nor judicial decisions, though they have some features of each. As
with any legal text, the actual language is central. Yet given the political nature of
these resolutions and the often hasty circumstances in which they are drafted,
the leading scholarly work on the subject recommends a liberal use of travaux
prparatoires (legislative history) and other contextual methods.20 Others have
favored a more textualist "plain meaning" approach to interpreting resolutions. 2
All agree on the general relevance of standard principles of treaty interpretation,
enshrined in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, though the
Convention's treaty interpretation guidelines are not strictly applicable to
Security Council resolutions. The few commentators to specifically address the
interpretation of Security Council resolutions agree that the consistency of terms
across resolutions and subsequent practice is understood to be a legitimate, if
imperfect, interpretive tool.23
There are two distinct ways in which the language of cognate withdrawal
resolutions is relevant to interpreting Resolution 242. The first, cross-instrument
consistency, takes as its premise that the drafters had available to them prior
withdrawal provisions. When patterns and consistent practice can be found
among these resolutions, it supports the view that a departure from such
practice is purposeful. In this use of cognate resolutions, the focus must be on
the pre-1967 ones. A different interpretive use of other resolutions is simply as a
test of English meaning and grammar. The central argument behind the broad
view of Resolution 242 is that "territories" is synonymous with "all the
territories"-that is, if someone wanted to demand complete withdrawal, saying
"withdrawal from territories" would be the natural way to do it.24 As a

45, 48-49 (1993) (arguing that the "spirit" of the resolution-"that peace and territorial conquest
are incompatible"-trumps any "linguistic ambiguities").
19
20

See Michael Byers, Agreeing to Disagree: SecuriH Council Resolution 1441 and IntentionalAmbigui y, 10
GILOBAL GOVERNANCE 165, 179-80 (2004).
See Michael C. Wood, The InterpretationofSecurio Counil Resolutions, 2 MAX PIANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 73,
93-95 (1998).

21

See, .for example, ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE INTERPRETATION OF ACTS AND RULES IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL. LAW 488-89 (2008).

22

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

23

See Wood, supra note 20, at 82, 89, 95; ASIA PACIFIC CENTRE FOR MILITARY LAW, INTERPRETING
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIl. RESOLUTIONS 6 (2012) ("lWe may look to any customs or

24

practice arising out of previous resolutions (such as phrases or terms that, over time, have come
to have a particular recognised meaning).").
See, for example, Wright, supra note 9.
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proposition about usage, it can be tested by examining how bodies calling for
territorial withdrawal provisions actually frame their demands. In this
grammatical approach, post-1967 resolutions are also relevant, as the English
language has not changed substantially in this time.

III. EVIDENCE FROM PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS
Territorial withdrawal demands occur in at least eighteen other Security
Council resolutions, ranging from the first days of the U.N. to the present, and
in a variety of geopolitical contexts. Among all the resolutions, there are certain
common patterns of language and phrasing. However, Resolution 242's phrase
"withdrawal... from territories" is entirely unique in Security Council practice.
Instead, resolutions before and after demand total withdrawal either by using the
definite article or by explicitly referring to the antebellum status quo (thus clearly
defining a complete withdrawal). Thus resolutions that demand full territorial
withdrawal say so unambiguously, unlike Resolution 242. Indeed, some of the
other resolutions resemble the proposed Soviet draft for Resolution 242, which
specified a return to the antebellum lines.25 Moreover, several resolutions use
comprehensive modifiers like "all" or "whole" to describe the extent of the
territorial withdrawal. Those modifiers were explicitly rejected in the
negotiations over the drafting of Resolution 242.26 Similarly, General Assembly
resolutions calling for territorial withdrawal in other contexts clearly specify the
extent of the withdrawal.27
The most probative sources for interpreting Resolution 242 are the
Security Council's pre-1967 resolutions, as the meaning of legal texts is fixed at
the time of their adoption. By using unambiguous wording, the five withdrawal
resolutions adopted before 1967 reveal obvious differences from the hazier
language of Resolution 242.28 While these differences may not conclusively

25

26
27

28

See U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1381st mtg.,

7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1381 (Nov. 20, 1967) ("The parties
to the conflict should immediately withdraw their forces to the positions they held before 5 June
1967 in accordance with the principle that the seizure of territories as a result of war is

inadmissible."); see also Ruth Lapidoth, Securio Council Resolution 242: An Analysis of its Main
Provisions, JERUSALEM
CTR.
FOR
PUB.
AFF.
13,
14
(June
4,
2007),
http://jcpa.org/text/resolution242-lapidoth.pdf (noting that the Soviet draft was not voted on).
See Lapidoth, supranote 25, at 19.
See, for example, G.A. Res. 62/243, 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/243 (Mar. 14, 2008) (calling for
"immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all the occupied
termitories" in Azerbaijan) (emphasis added).
This collection of withdrawal provisions was compiled by searching an electronic database of
Security Council resolutions for the term "withdrawal," as well as examining all resolutions related
to military incursions. I excluded repetitive and iterative withdrawal resolutions using the same
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prove the significance of the missing "the," they unequivocally demonstrate that
Resolution 242's language does not "naturally" mean total withdrawal, especially
when considered in the context of Security Council practice. The past
resolutions are particularly important because Security Council resolutions can
have their own linguistic habits and conventions ,29 and thus departing from an
established pattern may suggest a different meaning.
An examination of the relevant provisions highlights the uniqueness of
242's missing article. The bold emphasis has been added to highlight phrases
that connote a complete withdrawal, while italicization reflects the style of the
resolutions themselves.
A. Pre-1967 Territorial Withdrawal Provisions
1.

SC Res. 3 (1946): Calls for "the withdrawal of all USSR troops from

30
the whole of Iran"
2.
SC Res. 61 (1948): "Calls upon the interested Governments, without
prejudice to their rights ... with regard to a peaceful adjustment of the
future situation of Palestine... to withdraw those of their forces which
31
have advanced beyond the positions held on 14 October"

3.
SC
withdraw
4.
SC
withdraw

Res. 82 (1950): "Calls upon the authorities in North Korea to
32
forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel"
Res. 143 (1960): "Calls upon the Government of Belgium to
33
its troops from the territory of the Republic of Congo"

5.
SC Res. 210 (1965): "Calls upon the parties [India & Pakistan] to...
promptly withdraw all armed personnel to the positions held by them
34
before 5 August 1965"
Not all of the resolutions require withdrawal to pre-war lines. In particular,
Resolution 61, which concerns a situation most analogous to that of Resolution
242, did not require a withdrawal to the status quo ante. Responding to the
1948-49 Israeli-Arab War (Israel's War of Independence), the Council required
parties to return to "positions held on 14 October." However, interstate
hostilities had begun immediately upon Israel's creation in May 1948 (though

29

language in successive versions dealing with the same situation. Some other withdrawal
resolutions may not have been successfully identified by this methodology.
See, for example, Wood, supra note 20, at 82 (citing the practice of using the phrase "acting under

30

Chapter VII" in relevant resolutions, while noting that this and other "drafting practices" are not
always well known or consistently applied).
S.C. Res. 3, U.N. SCOR, 1st Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/2/Rev.l (I), at 2-3 (Apr. 4, 1946).

31

S.C. Res. 61, U.N. SCOR, 3d Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/2/Rev.1(I1), at 28 (Nov. 4, 1948).

32

S.C. Res. 82, U.N. SCOR, 5th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/4/Rev.1, at 4 (une 25, 1950).

33

S.C. Res. 143, U.N. SCOR, 15th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/15/Rev.1, at 5 (uly 14, 1960).

34

S.C. Res. 210, U.N. SCOR, 20th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/20/Rev.1, at 14 (Sept. 6, 1965).
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combat between Jewish and Arab units had begun the prior year), with two
truces between then and November,35 when the withdrawal resolution was
adopted. In the next five months of fighting, Arab forces had taken control of
significant portions of Palestine. The Council's withdrawal provision would have
allowed them to keep control of most of these territories, including the West
Bank, Gaza, and the Negev. 36
B. Post-1967 Territorial Withdrawal Resolutions
As discussed in Section II, resolutions adopted after Resolution 242 have
less evidentiary value. Subsequent resolutions may have been colored by its
unique semantic dispute, though what the effect of this bias would be is not
clear. The subsequent resolutions cannot be ignored because of their quantity
and consistency. Again, none adopts the general "territories" formulation.
Instead, they require withdrawal either from "the" territory or to specified
antebellum lines.
1.
SC
Res.
264
(1969):
Calls
on
South
Africa
to
"withdraw immediately its administration from the Territory [of Southwest

Africa]"
2.

3

SC Res. 353 (1974): "Requests the withdrawal without delay from the

Republic of Cyprus of foreign [Turkish] military personnel present" 38

3.
SC Res. 380 (1975): Calls on Morocco to "immediately H withdraw
' 39
from the Territory of Western Sahara
4.
SC Res. 384 (1975): Calls on Indonesia to "withdraw without delay all
its forces from the Territory [East Timor]" 40
5.
SC Res. 425 (1978): Calls on Israel to "withdraw forthwith its forces
41
from all Lebanese territory"
6.

SC Res. 466 (1980): "Demands that South Africa withdraw forthwith

all its military forces from the territory of the Republic of Zambia '

42

7.
SC Res. 502 (1982): "Demands an immediate withdrawal of all
43
Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)"

35
36

37
38

Seefor exan ple, U.N. S.C. Res. 50 & 54 (dealing with truce of June-July 1948).
See GilBERT, supra note 11, at 45-46 (10th ed. 2012).
S.C. Res. 264, U.N. SCOR, 24th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/24/Rev.1, at 1 (Mar. 20, 1969).
S.C. Res. 353, U.N. SCOR, 29th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/30, at 7 (July 20, 1974).

40

S.C. Res. 380, U.N. SCOR, 30th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/31, at 9 (Nov. 6, 1975).
S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/31, at 10 (Dec. 22, 1975).

41

S.C. Res. 425, U.N. SCOR, 33rd Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/34, at 5 (Mar. 19, 1978).

42

S.C. Res. 466, U.N. SCOR, 35th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/36, at 17 (Apr. 11, 1980).

43

S.C. Res. 502, U.N. SCOR, 37th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/38, at 15 (Apr. 3, 1982).

39
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8.
SC Res. 546 (1984): "Demands that South Africa... unconditionally
withdraw forthwith all its military forces occupying Angolan territory"44
9.
SC Res. 660 (1990): "Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately.., all
its forces to positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990"
4
(before the invasion of Kuwait) "
10. SC Res. 1304 (2000): "Demands... [tihat Uganda and Rwanda, which
have violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, withdraw all their forces from the territory of the
' 46
Democratic Republic of the Congo without further delay
11. SC Res. 1559 (2004): "Calls upon all remaining foreign [Syrian] forces
47
to withdraw from Lebanon"
12. SC Res. 1862 (2009): "Demands that Eritrea ... [wlithdraw its forces
48
and all their equipment to the positions of the status quo ante"
13. SC Res. 2046 (2012): Decides that Sudan and South Sudan must
"[u]nconditionally withdraw all of their armed forces to their side of the
49
border, in accordance with previously adopted agreements"
It is not surprising that most Security Council withdrawal resolutions
postdate Resolution 242; many more resolutions have been passed since 1967
than before. But the "the" dispute broke out almost immediately after the
passage of Resolution 242,50 and it remains a major point of contention. That is,
the Security Council has known about the problem of the missing "the" since
1967. If a missing "the" means nothing-if the words mean the same with or
without a "the" before "territories"---one would expect to see at least one other
withdrawal resolution using the same language as Resolution 242.
The consistency of subsequent practice is particularly notable in light of the
politics of the situation. Many nations claim that Resolution 242 requires a
complete and total withdrawal.5 s One might expect that these nations would,
going forward, purposefully omit a "the" before the geographic term in any
resolution contemplating complete withdrawal-if only to drive home the point
about the meaning of Resolution 242. That they have repeatedly not reverted to
Resolution 242's formulation suggests its language is simply not what one would

44

S.C. Res. 546, U.N. SCOR, 39th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/40, at I (Jan. 6, 1984).

45

S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46, at 19 (Aug. 2, 1990).
S.C. Res. 1304, U.N. SCOR, 55th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/56, at 62 Gune 16, 2000).

46
47
48

S.C. Res. 1559, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF/60, at 34 (Sept. 2, 2004).
S.C. Res. 1862, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF/64, at 288 (Jan. 14, 2009).

49

S.C. Res. 2046, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF/67, at 223 (May 2, 2012).

50

See Shabtai Rosenne, Directionsfor a Middle East Settlement Some Underying Legal Problems, 33 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 44, 60-61 (1968); see also Wright, supra note 9, at 275-76.
See Lapidoth, supra note 25, at 25 n.23.
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use to require a complete withdrawal, which was the goal sought in all the
subsequent resolutions examined here.
One might object that it was the interpretive trouble caused by Resolution
242's alleged ambiguity that prevented the use of the same language in
subsequent resolutions regarding other situations. But Resolution 242 has been
politically more important than any other resolution. Moreover, in the years after
its passage, the notion that Resolution 242 is at least unclear has not been
admitted by most states. So if states maintain that there is no doubt that
"territories" means "all the territories," one would expect them to have no
compunction in using the terms at least interchangeably. Indeed, given the
U.N.'s extraordinary interest in the Israeli-Palestinian issue, one might think they
would risk confusion elsewhere to clarify that Resolution 242 required complete
withdrawal. In any event, the risk of confusion about the scope of withdrawal
with other resolutions elsewhere would be negligible, as the other situations lack
the drafting history and other particular circumstances of Resolution 242.
One might also object that Israel's situation in 1967 was somehow unique,
and thus the language is different on that account. One of the more coherent
distinctions is that Resolution 242 used "territories" because Israel took several
noncontiguous territories from several different states. This does explain the
plural territories, but it is not clear why that eiminates a need for a definite
article. Moreover, resolutions related to other situations involving
noncontiguous territories have used a "the," such as Resolution 380, which
concerned Indonesia's invasion of East Timor. 2
Another notable difference between Resolution 242 and almost all
subsequent withdrawal resolutions is its lack of an immediacy provision. This
accords with the interpretation that the resolution calls for a negotiated solution,
which would necessarily require additional time to conclude. If the resolution
had called for an "immediate withdrawal of Israel ... from territories," it would
be harder to square with the partial withdrawal interpretation or with an
endorsement of negotiated boundaries as opposed to defaulting to Armistice
Lines. 3
IV. "INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY"
Some commentators argue that the preamble's reference to "the
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" helps to contextualize the
52

See S.C. Res. 380, supra note 39.

53

Security Council Resolution 338, passed in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, added an
immediacy requirement to Resolution 242. See S.C. Res. 338, st ora note 3, 2 (calling on "the
parties concerned to start immediately... the implementation of Security Council resolution
242").
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withdrawal provision, supporting the reading that a full withdrawal is required. 4
On its face, the argument has an obvious internal contradiction. It would make
little sense to invoke this principle to require Israel to return the West Bank to
Jordan and Gaza to Egypt, both of whom acquired the respective territories in
what was then a relatively recent war of aggression against Israel. (This objection
would not apply to the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula, which had been
Syrian and Egyptian sovereign territory, respectively, since before Israel's
independence.) Given that both Israel and the prior occupants acquired the
Gaza and West Bank by force, the "inadmissibility" clause could be understood
to require a negotiation of final borders between the belligerents, rather than
allowing either side's (changing) fortunes of war to determine them. 5 In any
case, it is generally agreed that while resolutions, like other legal texts, should be
read as a whole, operative provisions control preambulatory ones, not vice
versa.5 " In this regard, it is notable that in the Soviet draft, the analogous
language appeared in the main body of the resolution. 7
The Security Council did not invent the principle of non-acquisition of
territory by war to which it referred in the preamble. Rather, it invoked what had
by then become a customary international law norm. 8 At least since the
adoption of the U.N. Charter, international law forbade aggression as a means of
statecraft, and thus generally banned offensive war.59 Yet as will be seen, the
customary norm had significant caveats and exceptions, relating to the legality of
the underlying use of force, and the status of the territory in question. Therefore,
the preamble should be understood in relation to the limits of the international
norm.
It is important to distinguish the argument made here from a similar one
In the wake of the Six-Day War, several prominent legal scholars argued that
because Israel's use of force was defensive, it did not fall under the prohibition
of conquest.6" Their arguments were based mostly on inference: if the
54

Seefor example, Wright, supra note 9, at 270-71.

55

See S.C. Res. 242, supra note 1, 8. This reading would make more sense of the rest of the clause:
"the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and
lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security." Id.
See JOHN QUIGLEY, THE SIX-DAY WAR AND ISRAELI SELF-DEFENSE: QUESTIONING THE LEGAL

56

BASIS FOR PREVENTIVE WAR 111 (2013) (noting that operative provisions "carr[yl more weight"
than preambulatory ones); Lapidoth, supra note 25, at 17.
57

See U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1381 st mtg, supra note 25,

58

An early draft submitted by a non-aligned state explicitly related the "inadmissibility" provision to
the U.N. Charter. See Lapidoth, supra note 25, at 17.

59

See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL

60

See, for example, Stephen M. Schwebel, Editorial Comment, What Weight to Conquest?, 64 AM. J.
INT'l. L. 344, 346-47 (1970); Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner Reflections on the Status ofJudea
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prohibition of conquest is a corollary of the illegality of war in the U.N. Charter,
in circumstances where that rule does not apply, its corollary also drops out.6 In
the decades since the 1967 war, most scholars have rejected the contention that
international law tolerates defensive conquest. 62 They also offer little evidence
for this position, except for enumerating the relative number of scholars on
either side of the debate.
It may well be that a categorical norm against territorial acquisition as a
result of war has crystalized since 1967. But the real question for interpreting
Resolution 242 is how the law stood in 1967.63 This is particularly crucial
because the Six-Day War may be one of the only examples of colorable
defensive conquest since World War II. Thus, after 1967, views on the principle
became inextricable from views on the Arab-Israel conflict. Before Israel's
unexpected victories in 1967, that was not the case.
There is evidence-thus far unexplored in relation to Resolution 242-that
the U.N. Charter-based principle against conquest, at least as understood within
the U.N. before 1967, did not prohibit the acquisition of territory in a nonaggressive war. Key international legal discussions shortly after the birth of the
U.N. demonstrate that the new prohibition on conquest had several internal
limits. Thus, Resolution 242's preamble's reference to the general rule against
conquest would presumably incorporate this implicit limitation.
The present inquiry is not whether the right of self-defense authorizes
conquest or even whether it did so in 1967. Rather, the inquiry focuses only on
and Samaria, 3 ISR. L. REv. 279, 294 & n.60 (1968); ELIHU

LAUTERPACHT, ANGLO-ISR. ASS'N,

JERUSALEM AND THIE HOLY PLACES 51-53 (1968).
61

Schwebel cites one important piece of state practice: after the Korean War, the Republic of Korea
retained, with U.N. approval, significant territory north of the antebellum border (the 38th
parallel); there was no suggestion that the parties should return to the 38th parallel, and indeed
U.N. forces sought to push the North back much farther. See Schwebel, supra note 60, at 347. To
be sure, this might not demonstrate an acceptance of defensive conquest as much as conquest per
se, as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was left with territory south of the 38th parallel.
Schwebel might have cited the Indian conquest of Goa and other Portuguese territories in 1961 as
examples where the perceived lawfulness of the underlying resort to force-in this case, arising
not from self-defense but anti -colonialism-allowed for clear and undisputed title established by
conquest.

62

See

ENRICO

MILANO,

UNLAWFUL

TERRITORIAL

SITUATIONS

IN

INTERNATIONAL

LAW:

RECONCILING EFFECTIVENESS, LIGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 107-08 & n.30 (2006) (collecting
63

sources).
Many scholars ignore this basic point about inter-temporal law. For example, Antonio Cassese
cites a 1970 General Assembly resolution on "friendly relations between states" for evidence of
what the law was in 1967, but ignores pre-1967 resolutions and discussion in the General
Assembly. See ANTONIO CASSESE, THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED
PAPERS 280 (2008). Oddly, Cassese also misrepresents the weight of authority on the question
pre-1967, as he cites only Robert Jennings and suggests his views were generally accepted,
somethingJennings himself disclaims. See id. at 279-80.
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the meaning of the preambulatory "inadmissibility" clause, and its bearing on the
rest of the resolution. Therefore, this section develops evidence about how the
anti-conquest norm was understood at the time. The inadmissibility of territorial
acquisitions was a concept that had developed in the preceding decades, and at
the time was widely understood not to be absolute. Many of the contours of the
prohibition remained unclear. The preamble of Resolution 242 referred precisely
to this set of ideas, with all their unsettledness. Indeed, it was the vagueness of
the rule that could make it acceptable to all parties. To the extent the principle
did not apply to non-sovereign but rather "disputed" territory,64 it could
arguably countenance Egyptian, Jordanian, and Israeli acquisition of parts of the
territory of Mandatory Palestine.65
A. The Work of the International Law Commission
The records of the International Law Commission (ILC) from the post-war
years reveals that its distinguished members, tasked with more specifically
articulating the principles of the U.N. Charter,66 discussed these very issues.
What clearly emerged is that the prohibition of conquest was far from absolute.
Many of the leading jurists of the post-World War II era, including Manley
Hudson and James Brierly, thought that the lawfulness of the resort to force
determined the permissibility of subsequent conquest.6 7 The legality of the
belligerent's cause directly bore on the ability to take territory, as a series of
debates and discussions in the ILC makes clear.
The ILC's mission of setting out the basic principles of the U.N. era
resulted in the drafting of two codes of international law-a Draft Declarationon
the Rights and Duties of States (1949)6" and a Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and
Securio of Mankind (1954).69 The latter was a direct consequence of the historic

64

See Georg Schwarzenberger, 1itle to Temtoy: Response to a Challenge, 51 AI. J. INT'I. L. 308, 314

65

(1957) (arguing that international law restricts only the taking of the sovereign territory of one
state by another state, and that conquest is not relevant to non-sovereign territory).
See 1 ROSALYN HIGGINS, THFI DiEVEI.OPMNT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THF POLITICAl.
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 277, 317 (1962) (explaining that the U.N. did not treat Arab

66

"invasions" of israel/Palestine in 1948-49 as involving an issue of Art. 2(4) of the Charter,
because it was a "territory whose status was in dispute" and "objectively and generally in doubt").
The ILC is a body of international law experts, established by the General Assembly in 1947 to

67

develop and codify public international law. See Introduction, INT'l. L. COMM'N,
http://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcintro.htm.
See Preparationof a Draft Code of Offences againstthe Peace and Securi y of Mankind, [1950] 1 Y.B. Int'l L.

68

Comm'n 136, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950 [hereinafter ILC Draft Code Preparation 1950].
G.A. Res. 375 (IV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/375(IV) (Dec. 6, 1949).

69

Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Securiy of Mankind, [1954] 11 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 151,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1954/Add.1 [hereinafter 1954 Draft Code].
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General Assembly Resolution 177, which articulated and endorsed the legal
principles behind the Nuremberg Charter and subsequent military tribunal
judgments and called on the ILC to "[flormulate the principles of international
7°
law recognized in" the Nuremberg processes.
The drafting of both codes led to discussions about the legality of
annexation and conquest. 71 The ILC commissioners recognized that the U.N.
Charter created a new prohibition on conquest, as a result of its general ban on
the use of force in Article 2(4).72 However, they also recognized that
73
international law did not make all acquisition of territory by force illegal.
Hudson, for example, doubted that there was a blanket ban on such acquisitions
' 74
because "[a]nnexations varied very greatly between one case and another.
Several other delegates agreed that there was no total ban on forcible acquisition
of territory.75 In particular, the Dutch jurist J.P.A. Frangois worried that the rule
could apply to the actions of Holland, Belgium, and France, which conducted
post-World War 1I "frontier adjustments without consulting the populations."7 6
His colleagues reassured him that those were not the kind of acts encompassed
by the prohibition on annexation. 7 Thus, the leading jurists of the time did not
think all forcible territorial change was illegal, but only those acquisitions where
the underlying use of force-the recourse to war itself-was illegal.
The ILC reached a consensus that only conquest resulting from
"aggression"-that is, the illegal use of force-or through an "offence against
the peace and security of mankind" would be barred.78 In other words, the
legality of the underlying use of force was key to the legality of any territorial
changes resulting from it. Thus, where resort to force was not offensive but
defensive, it would not be prohibited. 7 The Draft's phrase "by means of acts
70

Id. at 149.

71

74

The commission noted the similarity of the questions involved in the two different Drafts. See 1
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 137, 80, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950 [hereinafter 1950 Yearbook
Int'l L. Comm'n].
U.N. Charter art. 2, 4 ("All Members shall refrain ... from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations.")
See ILC Draft Code Preparation 1950, supranote 67, at 136.
Id

75

See id. at 136-38.

76

Id. at 137.

77

See id.
Id. at 138. See also 1950 Yearbook Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 71, at 136 (suggestion of Mr.
Sandstrom to adopt language barring "annexation of territories by the threat or use of forcefor an
aggressivepuepose") (emphasis added).
See ILC Draft Code Preparation 1950, supranote 67, at 148, 257.

72

73

78
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contrary to international law"" encapsulates the Commission's view that only
when the use of force itself violated international law would the prohibition
apply."1
Moreover, the discussions repeatedly emphasized that only conquest of the
"territory of another State" would be prohibited. 2 Territories that were not
under the sovereignty of any state because they were disputed, under an
international mandate, or ownerless (terra nullius) would not fall within the
prohibition.8 3 This limitation was not contained in the first draft of the
provision, but after discussion, the provision was revised to clearly limit the
situations to sovereign territory. 4 Thus, the final draft unanimously adopted by
the ILC banned "[tihe annexation by the authorities of a State of territory
belonging to another State, by means of acts contrary to international law."8 5 This
limitation on the Charter's conquest ban to sovereign state territory anticipates,
but is analytically distinct from, Israel's post-1967 position that the Fourth

80

ILC Draft Code Preparation 1954, supra note 69, at 151 (emphasis added).

81

The penultimate draft outlawed "the annexation, contrary to international law, of territory
belonging to another State, or of territory under an international regime." Report of the International
Law Commission to the GeneralAssembly, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 9, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/1858,
reprinted in [19511 II Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 136, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add.1. The
major changes from this to the final draft are the limitation to sovereign territory and the
clarification that acts resulting in the conquest must themselves be illegal for the resulting
acquisition to be illegal.
Id.at 34-35, 58, 60, 65-68, 135.

82
83

84
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See 1950 Yearbook Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 71, at 119 (view of Mr. el-Khoury that state
practice shows that the seizure of territory belonging "by right to the State of which the invader
was a national" does not amount to an international crime).
Compare ILC Draft Code Preparation 1950, supra note 67, at 165 ("annexation of the territory of a
State"), with 1954 Draft Code, supra note 69, at 151 ("annexation by the authorities of a State of
territory belonging to another State").
1954 Draft Code, supra note 69, at 151 (emphasis added). For a contemporaneous example of an
annexation of territory under an international regime that was not met with any international
condemnation, consider Yugoslavia's annexation in October 1954 of much of the Free Territory
of Trieste, which it had occupied at the end of World War II. Trieste was designated by the
Security Council as an independent quasi-state under international administration. See S.C. Res. 16
(Jan. 10, 1947). Yugoslavia's takeover of the territory, however, took place pursuant to an
agreement with the U.K. and U.S., which partially administered the territory, and met with no
international condemnation. See Huey Louis Kostanick, The Geopolitics of the Baltics, in CHAR.s
JELAVICH & BARBARA JELAVICH, THE BALKANS IN TRANSITION: ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF BAI.KAN LIFE AND POIiTICS SINCE THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 22-23 (1963); see also CARSTEN
STAHN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL. TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION:
VERSAI.I.ES TO IRAQ AND BEYOND 188-91 (2008) (describing the establishment and governance

of the Free Territory).
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Geneva Convention's provisions on occupation do not apply to the West Bank
and Gaza. 6
B. The Relevance of Post-War Border Changes
The same consensus emerged during the drafting of the Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of States.8 7 From the first draft prepared by Panama, all
versions demanded non-recognition of territorial acquisition through the "illegal
use of force."8 8 In a meeting of ILC commissioners in May 1949, Frangois
spotlighted the large-scale revision of the borders of Axis nations by the
victorious Allies, in particular the then-pending annexation of much of Germany
by Poland.8 9 The ILC's allowance of militarized territorial change in narrow
circumstances reflected current state practice in the years immediately after the
adoption of the U.N. Charter. During the Commission's discussions, the victors
of World War II redrew sovereign borders in their favor and that of the Allies.90
For example, with the approval of the Allied governments, the Netherlands on
April 23, 1949 marched into and annexed 69 square kilometers of Germany,
then inhabited by 10,000 people. The Dutch justified it as a self-help reparation
for German war spoliations. 91 Italy was forced to hand over several towns and
92
border areas to France in the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy, signed in Paris.
More significantly, France partitioned the Saar region from occupied Germany,

86

87

88

See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 206-07 (2d ed. 2012). Israel's
position on the scope of occupation is based on the language of Common Article 2 of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and is thus distinct from the ILC's views discussed here, which
were based on the U.N. Charter and state practice.
See Summary Records of the First Session, [19491 1 Y.B. int'l L. Comm'n 143-44, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1949 [hereinafter Summay Records of the FirstSession 1949].
Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the GeneralAssemby, [1949] I Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 289,

9o

U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1949 (emphasis added); see G.A. Res. 375 (IV), supra note 68.
See Summary Records of the First Session 1949, supra note 87, at 143.
The Allies would base their rights in West Berlin on conquest (the city which was never

91

incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany, and instead remained under direct Tripartite
rule). See Quincy Wright, Some Le-galAspects of the Berlin Crisis, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 959, 961-61, n.9,
n.1l(1961) (criticizing the Western position on Berlin as in tension with principles of territorial
non-acquisition).
The Dutch had originally planned to annex a much larger chunk of Germany but were met with

89

92

opposition by the Allies. In 1963, Germany purchased most of the annexed territory back from
Holland. See BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL
BOUNDARY STUDY No. 31, GERMANY-NETHERLANDS BOUNDARY 4-5 (1964), available at
http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collecon/LimitsinSeas/IBS031 .pdf.
Other parts of Italy were apportioned among Greece and Yugoslavia. For a complete fist of
territories ceded to France, Yugoslavia, and Greece, see Treaty of Peace with Italy, arts. 6-9, Feb.
10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1245, 1374-78.
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governing it as a "protectorate" in customs union with France until 1957. 93 The
Soviet Union and Poland annexed large sections of Germany and presided over
similar adjustments in the territorial borders of their central European allies.
The commission members viewed these annexations as evidence of, rather
than violations of, international law.94 Thus, they concluded that under some
circumstances, international law still permits "territorial acquisitions made
through force." The post-war peace treaties carving up the Axis powers had not
yet been signed, and the Commission was conscious that the rules it made would
govern those deals-and should not be seen as repudiating them.95 The
Panamanian delegate, Ricardo Alfaro, who strongly favored banning conquest,
nonetheless agreed that the post-war territorial modifications were legal. He
distinguished between "conquest" and "reparations," suggesting again that
punishing an aggressor would not fall within the prohibition.96 Certainly, he
argued, the "restitution of territories acquired and held by force or... in
violation of international law" by the defeated power would not count as
prohibited conquest on the part of the victor.97 The Commission amended its
original language to clarify that territorial conquest would not be illegal when the
underlying use of force did not violate the U.N. Charter, 98 which led one
member to dissent on the ground that the Commission had decided that
"justified" territorial acquisitions were legal. 99
While the Draft Code was ultimately never fully adopted as a binding treaty
by states, its contents and drafting history reveal the thinking of the most
eminent international lawyers on the relevant questions. It is clear that as of the
early 1950s, there was a principle against the acquisition of territory through
force-the same principle referred to in the Resolution 242 preamble-and that
the principle had several limits, most saliently, that it only applied to uses of

93

See generally JACQUES FREYMOND, THE SAAR CONFLICT 1945-1955 (1960); STEFAN WOLFF,
DISPUTED TERRITORIES: THE TRANSNATIONAL DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC CONFJI.CT SETTLEMENT

87-97 (2003).
94

In this they were

95
96

See Summary Records of the First Session 1949, supra note 87, at 143.
Id.

97

Id.

98

See Draft Declarationon the Rights and Duties of States, art. 11, [1949] I Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 287, U.N.

99

See Summary Records of the First Session 1949, supra note 89, at 143-44. Roberto Cordova of Mexico
dissented on the ground that the Commission was seeking to vindicate the post-war peace
treaties, a view echoed by A.E.F. Sandstrom of Sweden.

not alone. See WESLEY L. GOULD, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
354 (1957) ("[A]t the end of both World Wars the transfer of territory was made possible by
conquest, and so it would seem that any prohibition against acquiring or transferring tide by
conquest applies only to aggressors.").

Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1949.
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force that were unlawful ab inilio and directed against the sovereign territory of
other states. These limitations were broadly agreed upon by jurists from entirely
different geopolitical backgrounds and were based in part on the post-war
practice of the victorious powers, which continued to take or hold territory well
into the 1950s.
C. The Views of Scholars Pre-1967
The limitations on the non-acquisition norm expressed in the ILC drafts
were also reflected in the wrings of the leading publicists of the time. In the
1950s and 60s, many scholars noted that the precise scope of a prohibition on
territorial acquisition as a result of war remained unclear."' 0 Several major
authorities, including Hersch Lauterpacht, T' maintained lawful force could lead
to lawful territorial change; Robert Jennings disagreed." 2 Yet Jennings conceded
that contrary views were widely held, and based his position entirely on policy
considerations, with no citation of practice or opinion juris. 103 Even Jennings
was not entirely clear about whether the legality of the use of force was
100

178 (1955) ("The legality, under
any and all circumstances, of the acquisition of territory through conquest and subjugation, is in
view of recent legal developments, open to question."); FI.ORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LEGAL
OSCAR SVARLIIEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF NATIONS

REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL COERCION: STUDIES IN THE LAW OF WAR IV/3 (1954) (noting

that there is "distinguished support" for the view that acquisition was only barred as a result of
illegal war, but arguing for a different rule in which the "final disposition of the territory," in cases
of lawful war, "should ... be based on a decision reached by the organized world community").
See also JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF PEACE 171-73 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) ("The truth is that international
law can no more refuse to recognize that a finally successful conquest does change the title to
territory than municipal law can a change of regime brought about by a successful revolution.");
HANS KE-ISEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 216 (1952) (arguing that illegality of

aggression does spill over to resulting conquests because the principle that rights cannot accrue
from illegal acts does not apply in international law). See generall NORMAN HILl., CLAIMS TO
TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS (1945).
1l

See generally H. Lauterpacht, The limits ofthe Operation ofte Law of War, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 206
(1953).

102

Compare ROBERT YEWDALLJENNINGS, THE ACQUISITON OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

103

55-56 (1963), with L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 574-75 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed.
1955) ("MTjide by conquest remains a valid title in those cases in which the conquering State is not
bound by the Charter of the United Nations... or when although when so bound, the resort to
war on its part is not, in the particular case, unlawful."); GOULD, supra note 94, (noting possibility
of title based on "defensive" conquest). See also Schwarzenberger, supra note 64, at 309 (discussing
the U.N. Charter's "outlawry of titles based on war other than war in self-defense and, according
to some writers, even on the latter").
See JENNINGS, supra note 102, at 56; see also C.A. Weston, Reviews, 27 MODERN L. REV. 113, 114
(1964) (reviewing JENNINGS, supra note 102) (calling Jennings's ideas about conquest
"propos[al]s," and noting that Jennings makes considerable allowance for forcible territorial
change in the form of his self-help exception).
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irrelevant to the legality of a resultant acquisition of territory. After discussing
self-defense, Jennings distinguished the situation of "forcible self-help," where a
state uses force to take territory to which it has a better claim to tide than the
prior possessor. The mere use of force to take control of its claimed territory in
no way vitiates its tide, which would not be based on conquest but rather on
some preexisting circumstances. Jennings conceded that this use of force would
not be unlawful because international law does not prohibit one state's use of
force "within its own territory," even if that territory had been under the
consolidated administration of another state.104 Thus, even for Jennings, the
legality of the use of force colors the legality of ensuing territorial changes.
D. Drafting the Declaration on Friendly Relations, 1966-1970
The General Assembly's 1970 "Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" articulates a strong version
of the inadmissibility-of-conquest norm that, if used to interpret Resolution
242's preamble, would point towards a complete withdrawal."0 ' While the
Declaration was only made in 1970, the Special Committee that drafted the
declaration had been created by the General Assembly in 1963. The Committee
was tasked with formulating the specifics of various international principles,
including the Charter prohibition on the use of force. Given the 1970 outcome
of the Committee, one might wonder at what point its understanding of the antiacquisition norm emerged. An examination of the records and debates of the
Committee shows that, as of 1967, it did not agree on recommending a
prohibition on conquest resulting in lawful force or of non-sovereign territory.
While proposals to this effect had been made in the 1964-66 period, they had
encountered substantial opposition, and no consensus emerged until 1970.
Given that the Committee's task was not merely to codify international law but
to work for its "progressive development"-that is, to suggest new rules-this is
further evidence that the non-acquisition norm, as it stood in 1967 and would
have been generally understood at the U.N, contained salient exceptions that
could apply to the situation dealt with in Resolution 242.
supra note 102, at 66.
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The first report of the Special Committee outlined its debates in its first
It considered several proposals to prohibit the "use of force in territorial
disputes or boundary problems,"'0 7 but the discussion of this proposal was
general and cursory. A related discussion about the principle of non-recognition
of situations brought about by the use of force saw significant disagreement
about the principle. Several members opposed any "general rule," noting that
territorial change was sometimes legitimate or justified, as when the prevailing
party had not "illegally resorted to force." ' No consensus was reached on these
points.
As the Special Committee continued its work in 1966, it discussed a report
by its rapporteur, Hans Blix." 0 One of the most divisive issues involved
proposals to include "international lines of demarcation" in the prohibition on
the use of force to change state borders."' Proponents argued that "the
maintenance of peace depended on respect" for armistice lines, noting that they
were often under U.N. supervision and posed greater risks of conflict than
established borders." 2 Opponents argued that the sponsors could not seriously
"propose that demarcation lines should fall within the concept of territorial
inviolability or to sanction under international law demarcation lines that include
portion of other States ... or make ... armistice lines into final boundaries."'' 3
Similar discord arose on the question of non-recognition of such territorial
changes, with opponents noting the post-WWII practice of states would make
such a rule "disastrous."" 4 The legality of the underlying use of force was also
mentioned.1 5
The next report covered discussions at the Commission's 1967 session,
held immediately after the Six Day War and before passage of Resolution 242.116
While brief mention was made of the war,1' 7 the representatives remained
year.0 6
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divided on the same issues as before. Again, "opinions were divided" on
whether the prohibition of the acquisition applied across "international lines of
'
demarcation."118
Some representatives saw such a rule as "improper and
dangerous" because it would de facto recognize or perpetuate illegal situations;
others objected that such lines were real, and crossing them implicated the same
principles as Article 2(4) of the Charter. The Special Committee continued with
its discussion of non-recognition of territorial situations brought about by
force. 9 Again some members thought it limited to situations of the "unlawful
use of force," and in particular, aggression.' 20 The disagreement over these issues
continued in the Committee's 1969 debates.121 Indeed, despite years of
discussion, the Committee had failed to agree more broadly on the general
principle concerning the prohibition of the use of force, of which these issues
were particular instantiations.
At this point, the General Assembly asked the Committee to complete its
work. The territorial change questions remained a subject of debate. The
decision to include the provisions found in the Declaration was first made by the
drafting committee in early 1970, shortly before the Special Committee
approved the draft declaration and submitted it to the General Assembly.
V. CONCLUSION
The wording of Resolution 242's territorial withdrawal clause is unique
among the nineteen territorial withdrawal demands described here. Its lack of a
clear mandate for total withdrawal, while not manifest on its face, becomes more
evident when compared with similar provisions adopted by the Council both
before and after Resolution 242. The singular occurrence of the missing "the"
suggests that "withdrawal from territories" is not simply another way of saying
all the territories, but a purposeful difference.
To be sure, this is but one piece of evidence to be used in interpretation. It
is arguably less important than the drafting history, the French text of
Resolution 242, and the other provisions of Resolution 242. But all these factors
have been argued extensively both ways for decades, and new evidence can be
important to navigating this impasse.
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121 See Report of the Special Committee, U.N. GAOR, 24,h Sess., U.N. Doc. A/7619 IT 65-67, 7781 (1969). In 1969, more nations seemed to favor mentioning "international lines of demarcation"
than before. The United Arab Republic, India, and Cameroon put forward a rather unusual
suggestion to bar recognition of forcible territorial changes, or even occupation, involving
territory "in which mankind has a common interest." Id.at 80.
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Moreover, an exploration of how the norm against territorial acquisition
was understood at the time - as reflected in the debates and Draft Codes of the
International Law Commission, the writings of leading scholars, and the drafting
history of the Friendly Relations Declaration - all show that the norm was not
understood to categorically prohibit such changes. While the scope of the norm
was uncertain, it was widely understood to allow territorial change involving
lawful use of force or non-sovereign territories. While this changed rapidly after
1967, moving towards an absolute prohibition, this is not the norm that the
preamble referred to. Rather, it referred to an unsettled but non-absolute norm,
which could allow for incomplete withdrawal in the circumstances of the 1967
Arab-Israel War.
Finally, it may be that nothing can conclusively prove what Resolution 242
meant because the resolution was drafted precisely to be ambiguous. This is
hardly surprising for a diplomatic, rather than a legal, document-let alone one
negotiated among rival superpowers-the purpose of which is to elide
disagreements rather than emphasizing them.
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